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WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE - CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
AS A DEFENSE
New Mexico. Le Doux v. Martinez' called for a construction
of the New Mexico wrongful death statute with regard to de-
fenses which might be interposed to an action based thereon. A
child two years and eight months of age had attempted to cross
a street in the middle of a block and had been struck and killed
by a taxicab driven by an agent of the defendant. The child was,
at the time, in the care and custody of an uncle. As a first separate
defense the taxi company pleaded the contributory negligence of
the plaintiffs in permitting the child on the street at the time and
place of the accident, and as a second separate defense pleaded
the contributory negligence of the child.
The statute to be construed is in part as follows:
Whenever any person shall die from any injury resulting from, or
occasioned by the negligence, unskillfulness or criminal intent of any
officer, agent, servant or employee ... or of any driver of any state
[stage] coach or other public conveyance, while in charge of the same
as driver ... the corporation, individual or individuals, in whose em-
ploy any such officer, agent, servant, employee, engineer or driver, shall
be at the time such injury was committed, or who owns any such rail-
road, locomotive, car, stage coach, or other public conveyance, at the
time any injury is received ... shall forfeit and pay for every person
or passenger so dying, the sum of ten thousand dollars ($10,000),
which may be sued and recovered .... 2
This statute was patterned after the Missouri wrongful death
statute' but differs from that statute in one respect, among others.
The Missouri statute provides for specific defenses, among which
is negligence of the deceased, whereas the New Mexico statute
makes no mention of defenses.
I --- N.M., 254 P. 2d 685 (1953).
2N. M. STAT. 1941 ANN. (1951 Supp.) § 24-104.
8 Mo. REV. STAT. (1949) §§ 537.070, 537.090.
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The trial court returned a verdict for the defendant taxicab
company. The case was one of first impression in the Supreme
Court of New Mexico with reference to the defenses permissible
in an action under the wrongful death statute. The statute having
been adopted by New Mexico from another state, the general rules
applicable to such adoptions should apply in this case. It is a
general rule that the adoption of a statute of another state will
carry with it the interpretation or construction placed upon the
statute by the highest court in the jurisdiction from which the stat-
ute was adopted.4 To this general rule there are several excep-
tions, one of these being that if the legislature in the adopting
state clearly indicates, expressly or by implication, that it does
not intend to adopt the construction of the courts of the foreign
jurisdiction, the rule is inapplicable. Where the adopted statute
differs substantially from its form in the foreign state, it will not
be presumed that the construction announced by the courts of the
foreign jurisdiction has been adopted.5 The New Mexico legisla-
ture omitted the provision in the Missouri statute setting forth
permissible defenses, thereby indicating that it was not the intent
of the legislature to adopt that provision. Since the provision of
the Missouri statute with regard to defenses had not been adopted,
it could not be inferred that the decisions of Missouri courts on
the question of defenses controlled or had any weight in New
Mexico. In its opinion the New Mexico Supreme Court stated
that the legislature manifested an intent to admit all common law
defenses through the omission of any provision setting forth spe-
cific defenses, and that decision seems correct. Contributory neg-
ligence of the deceased being a well recognized common law
defense, it was held a defense to an action brought under the New
Mexico wrongful death statute.
The verdict in the trial court was based on an imputation of
contributory negligence. The negligence of the uncle, having
4 CRAWFORD, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (1940) § 234.
a Id., § 235.
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charge of the child at the time, was found, under instruction by
the court, to bar a recovery by the parents of the child.
The supreme court reversed the trial court, stating as grounds
that the pleadings of the defendant did not support an instruction
encompassing negligence of the uncle. The only parties alleged
to be contributorily negligent were the parents of the child and
the child itself. Since the defendant had specifically pleaded con-
tributory negligence, such specific pleadings served to limit the
scope of general allegations of negligence.' The trial court also
was held to have erred in not submitting the plaintiff's requested
instruction giving consideration to the age of the child in deter-
mining the standard of care which the taxicab driver owed to the
child. The court stated the rule long recognized by American
courts: "More care must be exercised toward children than to-
wards persons of mature years.'' 7
The case has value as precedent and authority on the construc-
tion of the New Mexico wrongful death statute, as the reversal
by the supreme court was on grounds other than the statutory
construction, of which it approved.
INTENTIONALLY INFLICTED MENTAL SUFFERING - A NEW TORT?
Texas. The case on which most comment has been made in the
field of tort law coming out of the Texas Supreme Court in sev-
eral years is that of Harned v. E-Z Finance Co.. W. R. Harned
and wife sued four loan companies and one insurance company
for statutory penalties of $137.50 growing out of alleged charges
of usurious interest. The plaintiffs sought additional recovery of
$100 actual damages for the mental pain and anguish suffered
as a result of the defendants' collection methods, and an addi-
tional $50 as exemplary or punitive damages. The suit was filed
in the County Court at Law, Dallas County, and the defendants
6 41 AM. Jun., Pleading, § 33.
7 38 AM. JUR., Negligence, § 40.
8151 Tex. 641, 254 S.W. 2d 81 (1953).
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filed a special exception as to substance asserting that the plaintiffs
had stated no cause of action in that part of their petition alleging
mental suffering and claiming that the county court had no juris-
diction to hear the case. The plaintiffs' allegations were that the
defendants had made telephone calls to the plaintiffs at all hours
of the day and night, had threatened to cause Harned to lose his
job, and had threatened to "take up a collection in the neighbor-
hood"9 to apply to the debt. Plaintiffs further alleged that the
harassment was "wanton, willful, and malicious."'" The trial
court sustained the defendant's exception.
On the plaintiff's failure to amend, the trial court dismissed
the case for want of jurisdiction. The court of civil appeals wrote
a tentative opinion concluding that the plaintiffs had stated no
cause of action as to the mental suffering, and then on its own
motion certified the question of its correctness to the supreme
court. The supreme court answered in an unanimous decision that
no error had been committed.
In announcing its decision the court reviewed at length the
cases cited by the plaintiffs in support of recovery" and distin-
guished only one, Clark v. Association Retail Credit Men of Wash-
ington, D. C., from the case at bar. The court then analyzed the
writings of two prominent text writers in the field, Prosser and
Magruder, 2 and proceeded to state the recognition given the
"new tort" in the Restatement of Torts.'" Having waded through
this quite formidable array of authority, the court concluded
9 151 Tex. at 642, 254 S.W. 2d at 82.
10 Ibid.
11 Clark v. Association Retail Credit Men of Washington, D. C., 70 App. D. C. 183,
105 F. 2d 62 (1939) ; Herman Saks & Sons v. Ivey, 263 Ala. App. 246, 157 So. 265
(1934); State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P. 2d 282
(1952); Barnet v. Collection Service Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.W. 25 (1932) ; La Salle
Extension University v. Fogarty, 126 Neb. 457, 253 N.W. 424 (1934).
12 Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering, A New Tort, 37 Mich. L.
Rev. 874 (1939) ; Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbances in the Law of Torts,
49 Harv. L. Rev. 1033 (1936).
13 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (1948 Supp.) 612.
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that Texas cases cited in prior years announced a rule of law
inconsistent with the "new tort" and upheld the action of the court
of civil appeals in sustaining the dismissal of the suit.
The two decisions cited by the court as stating the Texas rule
in mental suffering cases are certainly distinguishable upon their
facts from the present case. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Trott 4
involved an attempt by a woman to recover for anguish caused
by the negligent operation of defendant's train by which she was
put in fear of her life. There was no allegation or suggestion in
the case or any cases mentioned or cited that the complained of
acts were willfully perpetrated. Renfro Drug Co. v. Lawson 5 was
an attempt on the part of a father to recover damages for mental
suffering caused him by a story printed in a magazine, alleged
to have been sold by the defendant, containing libelous remarks
about the plaintiff's deceased daughter. The main question before
the court was the right of a survivor to sue for a libel committed
against the deceased, and the court was principally concerned
with a construction of the Texas libel statute.
The case of So Relle v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,"6 relied
on by the Harneds, was said by the court to have been overruled
by later decisions, but it is to be noted that the rule of the So Relle
case has been applied by the Texas courts in many subsequent
cases.
Stating that the collection of usurious interest was neither a
crime nor a tort and therefore there existed no "peg" on which
to hang the damage caused by the mental suffering of the plain-
tiffs, the court commented that if there should be a recovery in
cases of the Harned type the legislature was the body appropriate
to provide for it. Mental suffering alone was regarded as too
subtle and speculative, its consequences too intangible and
peculiar, to permit of the court's ascertainment and measurement.
1486 Tex. 412, 25 S.W. 419 (1894).
18 138 Tex. 434, 160 S.W. 2d 246 (1942).
18 55 Tex. 308 (1881).
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Thus, the position of the Texas court seems to be firmly estab-
lished, refusing recovery for mental suffering wilfully, wantonly
and maliciously inflicted when such suffering is unconnected with
property damage, bodily injury of a physical nature, or some
independent crime or tort.17 In this respect Texas appears to be
in that transitory stage of legal evolution in which the damage
element of mental suffering is treated exclusively as a parasitic
factor.
ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE- REJECTION OF THE "IMPLIED
INVITATION" FICTION
Texas. The Texas Supreme Court in Eaton v. R. B. George
Investments, Inc.,s" reiterated the new Texas rule on the doctrine
of "attractive nuisance," as first stated in the now famous decision
of Banker v. McLaughlin.9 In the Eaton case Ginger Dale Ensley,
three years and eight months old stepdaughter of the plaintiff,
was drowned in a cattle dipping vat enclosed by a white fence
and chute on the premises of the defendant. Testimony showed
that the vat had been unused for two years, had not been drained,
was not known to the plaintiff to be on the premises, and could
have been easily covered with lumber in two hours with hammer
and saw at a cost of about thirty dollars. The case was tried on
the theory of attractive nuisance. In answer to a special issue the
jury found that the structure was not unusually attractive to chil-
dren such as Ginger Dale Ensley, and therefore it did not answer
the corollary questions as to the other elements of liability under
the doctrine of attractive nuisance. The jury further found in
answer to unconditional issues that the defendant was negligent
in failing to notify the plaintiff of the vat and in failing to cover
the vat, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the
17 See Green, "Mental Suffering" Inflicted by Loan Sharks No Wrong, 31 Tex.
L. Rev. 471 (1953), for an extensive comment on the Harned case and its background.
18 ----- Tex --------, 260 S.W. 2d 587 (1953).
19 146 Tex. 434, 208 S.W. 2d 843 (1948).
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child's death; that plaintiff was not contributorily negligent; and
that damages were suffered by the plaintiff in the amount of
$11,597.50. Both parties moved for judgment, and defendant's
motion was sustained on the ground that the finding of the jury
that the structure was not unusually attractive to young children
negatived any implied invitation to the child to enter on the prem-
ises, leaving her a bare trespasser or licensee to whom the de-
fendant owed no duty. The court of civil appeals affirmed the
trial court, using virtually the same reasoning. The supreme court
in disposing of the case recognized that ordinarily it would reverse
and render, but stated that since the case had been tried on the
wrong theory, it would remand for further proceedings in the
trial court consistent with the principles announced by the court.
Under the old forms of action trespassers were owed no duty
by the landowner with regard to their personal safety while on
the land. The Supreme Court of the United States established an
exception to this general rule in the case of children in Sioux
City & P. R. R. v. Stout,2" holding that a railroad owed a tres-
passing child the duty to exercise reasonable care to see that the
child was not hurt on the railroad's turntable. Later cases, in
attempting to justify the exception, created the fiction of "implied
invitation," saying that the presence of the object or structure
on the defendant's land, naturally attractive to those of tender
years, was an invitation to children to enter the premises.21 Texas
decisions early adopted the rule of the Stout case.22 However,
with the rule came misapplications and misconceptions. The most
noteworthy of these judicial slips was United Zinc & Chemical
Co. v. Britt,"8 in which the Supreme Court of the United States
held that before the doctrine of attractive nuisance would apply,
the child must have been attracted onto the premises by the object
20 17 Wall. 657 (U.S. 1873).
21 San Antonio & A. P. Ry. v. Morgan, 92 Tex. 98, 46 S.W. 28 (1898) ; Fort Worth,
D. C. Ry. v. Measles, 81 Tex. 474, 17 S.W. 124 (1891); Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. Mc-
Whirter, 77 Tex. 356, 14 S.W. 26 (1890).
22 See note 21 supra.
22 258 U.S. 268 (1922).
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which injured him. The Texas Supreme Court was led astray by
this opinion and was induced to hold that the landowner owed
no duty where a mother and child trespassed to gather persimmons
and the child fell in an old cesspool and drowned.2
In 1948 came the opportunity to set the errant feet of Texas
judges back on the path of justice. James McLaughlin's five-year-
old son drowned in a bole of water on a vacant, weed-grown lot
owned by H. F. Banker in a newly-developed subdivision near
Orange, Texas. The water bole was created by Banker in securing
fill for adjacent lots. It was of little or no utility at the time of
the drowning and had been of such character for some time. The
supreme court, in allowing recovery, stated that the attractive
nature of the property and its proximity to traveled ways, far
from being controlling on the issue of liability, were merely fac-
tors to be considered in determining the owner's ability to antici-
pate the presence of members of the public.25
The Eaton case follows the Banker case explicitly and sets out
the four criteria for liability of a landowner to a trespassing
child found in the Restatement of Torts26 and in a leading
'treatise.2" These standards impose liability if
(a) the place where the condition is maintained is one upon which
the possessor knows or should know that such children are likely to
trespass, and,
(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or should
know and which he realizes or should realize as involving an unreason-
able risk of death or serious bodily harm to such children, and
(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condi-
tion or realize the risk involved in intermeddling in it or in coming
within the area made dangerous by it, and
(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition is slight
as compared with the risk to young children involved therein.28
24 Gotcher v. City of Farmersville, 137 Tex. 12, 151 S.W. 2d 565 (1941).
22 PROSSER, TORTS (1941) 617, 619.
26 § 339.
27 PRoss-i, TORTS (1941) 620-625.
28 2 RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 339.
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The court said that the finding by the jury that the structure was
not unusually attractive to children in no way barred recovery
since the findings of negligence and proximate cause, and the
evidence as to the age of the child and lack of utility of the vat
were sufficient to allow recovery under the modem Texas rule.
Thirteen jurisdictions, composed chiefly of the leading indus-
trial states, do not recognize the attractive nuisance doctrine.29
Among the remainder there is some hesitancy to apply the doc-
trine in the case of water hazards." The reasoning of the courts
in this regard is that water hazards exist everywhere in nature,
taking a yearly toll of both young and old, and to compel a land-
owner to guard against such misfortunes would be untenable.3
Texas, while formerly denying the applicability of the doctrine in
many instances, 2 now has adopted the doctrine in all its applica-
tions but in doing so has shown that "attractive nuisance" is a
misnomer. For the attractive nature of the object is merely a factor
in determining the duty owed by the landowner to the child, and
the object causing the harm need not be a common law nuisance
so long as it meets the requirements of little or no utility, pos-
sesses a quality of danger not within the comprehension of chil-
dren, and is known to the landowner to involve a danger to such
children as may come in contact with it.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE- MATTER OF FACT OR
MATTER OF LAW?
Texas. The case of Sargent v. Williams"a finds the Texas
Supreme Court, by a six-to-three decision, extending the doctrine
of contributory negligence as a matter, of law to a new fact situ-
29 Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia and West Virginia.
s See Note, 8 A. L. R. 2d 1262 (1948).
31 Cobb v. Lowe Mfg. Co., 227 Ala. 456, 150 So. 687 (1933) ; Salladay v. Old
Dominion Copper Mining Co., 12 Ariz. 124, 100 Pac. 441 (1909) ; Edmond v. Kimberly-
Clark Co., 159 Wis. 83, 149 N.W. 760 (1914).
32 Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Edwards, 90 Tex. 65, 36 S.W. 430 (1896)
Dobbins v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas, 91 Tex. 60, 41 S.W. 62 (1892) ; Texas-
Louisiana Power Co. v. Bihl, 66 S.W. 2d 672 ( Tex. Comm. App. 1933).
23 ............ Tex ---.- , 258 S.W. 2d 787 (1953).
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ation. A boy of thirteen, having borrowed the family car, was
taking two girls of the same age on a social trip to a city some
sixty miles distant. Ten miles short of their destination, while
traveling approximately 110 miles per hour, the boy lost control
of the car with resulting serious injury to the two girls. The
parents of the girls sued in their own right and as next friends of
the girls for damages resulting from the injuries. The jury found,
on the question of the girls' contributory negligence, that they knew
the boy was an incompetent and reckless driver and knew that he
had no driver's license, but that riding with the boy having this
knowledge did not constitute negligence on the part of the girls.
The jury further found that the girls did not fail to protest the
speed at which the boy was driving and so were not negligent in
that regard. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiffs, and the
defendant appealed. The court of civil appeals reversed the trial
court, finding the girls guilty of contributory negligence as a
matter of law, and rendered the case in favor of the defendant.
Petition for writ of error was granted by the supreme court.
After argument the court of last resort affirmed the court of civil
appeals.
Both the court of civil appeals and the supreme court based
their decision on the recent holding in Schiller v. Rice. 4 The lat-
ter case was a suit by the guests in the car of a drunken host who
were injured when the car struck a pole and a lamp post. Prior
to the accident the guests had had several opportunities to leave
the group, and all were well aware of the condition of the driver
for some time prior to the accident. In the court of civil appeals
the guests stated as a counterpoint to the host's point of appeal
that "[c]ontributory negligence and assumed risk are questions
for jury unless driver is obviously intoxicated."3 The jury found
that the driver was intoxicated and that the guests knew of that
fact. Therefore, the contributory negligence of the guests was no
longer a question of fact for the jury but could be found by the
"4 151 Tex. 116, 246 S.W. 2d 607 (1952).
35 Id. at 122, 246 S.W. 2d at 611.
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court as a matter of law. Since the only requirement to defeat an
action under the Texas Automobile Guest Statute,3 6 even where
the defendant is shown to have been heedless or in reckless dis-
regard of the rights of others, is ordinary contributory negligence
on the part of the plaintiff, 7 the plaintiff is denied recovery where
such negligence is found whether as a matter of fact or of law.
In drawing analogy between Schiller v. Rice and the present
case, the supreme court declared that the doctrine of "voluntary
exposure to risk' 3' applies to instances of a guest knowingly en-
trusting his fate to an incompetent driver. The court found no dif-
ference between the risk of a driver who is drunk and that of one
who is both reckless and incompetent in his natural state. Pro-
ceeding to the logical conclusion of an application of Schiller v.
Rice, the girls were held negligent in undertaking the trip with
the defendant, notwithstanding jury findings to the contrary, and
such negligence was held contributory to their injury notwith-
standing the absence of findings on the issues of proximate cause.
The seemingly ameliorating facts that the girls protested the speed
at which the boy was driving and had no opportunity to leave the
car after beginning the trip were rendered ineffective by the rea-
soning of the supreme court that the negligent act of the girls was
the entering of the car rather than remaining in the car after the
defendant began to drive recklessly. This reasoning was based on
the knowledge of the girls as to the defendant's "wild" driving
habits, and on the fact that inherently reckless drivers do not
become safe drivers in the twinkling of an eye or after a promise
to drive carefully. The girls, having with knowledge submitted
themselves to the very danger which injured them, would not be
heard to protest the occurrence of the injuring incident. 9
'o TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 6701b.
s Schiller v. Rice, 151 Tex. 116, 129, 246 S.W. 2d 607, 615 (1952).
38 The Texas courts apply the doctrine of assumption of risk only to master-servant
relationships. To take the place of this doctrine in instances not involving these two
parties the "voluntary exposure to risk" doctrine was created by the legal theorists.
The two doctrines differ only in their application.
39 See 2 RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 466, Comment e on Clause (a).
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A strong dissenting opinion, citing much authority, stressed
the general rule that contributory negligence, by its very nature,
is a question of fact for the jury. 4 There was also a discussion
of assumption of risk, which was apparently included to counter
the mention in the majority opinion of the Texas doctrine of "vol-
untary exposure to risk."'" The dissent distinguished Schiller v.
Rice on the facts. In the Schiller case the injured persons were
mature, experienced women with the power to appreciate the dan-
ger to which they exposed themselves. They had ample opportun-
ity to leave the host's car with little inconvenience to themselves
on several occasions. The girls injured in the Sargent case were
young and of immature judgment, had ridden with the defendant
previously without injury and had every right to suppose another
ride would be free of danger. They had no opportunity to leave
the car after embarking on the trip. Under such facts there was
at least a question presented on which reasonable men could
differ, and the matter should have been submitted to the jury for
decision under a proper charge.
In following the Schiller case the Texas Supreme Court did
not abrogate the general rule that contributory negligence is a
question of fact for the jury. The court simply applied the equally
well recognized exception to the rule that where facts are not such
that reasonable men may differ as to the consequences to follow
from them, the court may determine such consequences as a matter
of law without referring the question to a jury. As to whether the
facts in the Sargent case fit the exception there is room for doubt,
as shown by the dissenting opinion. The law in the case is not
revolutionary, but the application is novel, and the case will pro-
vide a guidepost for future litigation in similar fact situations.
Hubert Gentry, Jr.
40 Walsh v. Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co., 140 Tex. 385, 167 S.W. 2d 1018 (1943);
Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Gasscaihp, 69 Tex. 545, 7 S.W. 227 (1888); 5 AM. JuR.,
41 38 AM. Jun., Negligence, § 173; 65 C. J. S., Negligence, § 174.
Automobiles, § 47.
